I. Introduction
Financial crisis is currently sweeping across the globe with devastating effects. The Chinese economy, once the star performer on the world stage, proves not crisis-proof and cracks are already emerging under the pressure of the downturn of the world.
The dynamism of China's export is losing its steam and the vigour of economic growth is fading. As a result, Chinese jobs are suffering, and social tensions have brewed. Equally alarming is the fact that the falling economic conditions have stirred up questions on the wisdom of the reform and opening-up policy that China has adopted for more than three decades in transforming the economy to a market one.
The rising popular resentments may force the government to yield to economic nationalism, which would have world-wide repercussions (Prasad, 2009 , Mile, 2009 .
At the mercy of the crisis, China's growth is quick to slide. In the second quarter of 2008, China recorded a growth rate of 10.1%, down from 10.6% in the first quarter.
Growth further slowed to 9% in the third quarter the lowest in five years. The figure was to further drop to 6.8% in the fourth quarter. The year-on-year growth rate for 2008 finally came to 9.0%. This result may look not too bad in an international context. However, in comparison to her own past, China in 2007 registered a growth rate of 11.4% and the average growth rate for the past 30 years was 9.7%. The Chinese economy is clearly dipping.
In the general decline of the economy, the shrinkage of China's export was particularly dramatic. Whereas the annual growth rate of export was registered 35.7% in 2004, 23.2% in 2005, 23.8% in 2006 and 23.5% in 2007 , Chinese exporters only managed to achieve a growth rate of 17.2% in 2008, the lowest for the past 5 years. In real terms, the export growth was merely 8% -9%. In the beginning months of 2009, the situation continued to worse, with export contracted by 21.1% on a monthly basis.
With the slowdown of the economy, Chinese jobs are suffering. Global downturn means falling demand for Chinese exports, resulting in factory closures and layoffs on a daily basis in many parts of China, especially in the Southeast. Domestically, overcapacity has long resulted in overproduction which translates as over-employment.
Now the global downturn exacerbates the situation by throwing out more workers due to decelerating industrial output and reduced foreign investment, hence unemployment is climbing in China. In addition, there are annual additions to the army of job seekers including more than 6 million university graduates and at least 10 million immigrant farmers looking for a job in the city.
Estimates of how many jobs have already been lost vary, but most put it at around 20 million (Economist, 19 March 2009) . To make the situation worse, the Chinese economy is decelerating. According to the World Bank, the forecast growth for China is 6.5% in 2009, which tends to further reduce job opportunities. By any standards, it is no small task for China to copy with the growing pressure of unemployment.
There is another social aspect to the crisis effects. The grim economic conditions and rising employment have stirred up questions on the wisdom of China's current policy that seeks benefits from globalization with minimum costs by decoupling from the American and world economy. Indications are that political debates are raging inside
Chinese elites about this position ( Mile, 2009) . The bigger picture is that resentments are brewing within the Chinese population. To many, the market oriented reform and western oriented opening-up have brought about more sufferings than paybacks. The popular opinions thus are divided regarding the future direction of the nation, with very strong calls for returning to the good old days (Mile, 2009 ).
This is a more worrisome development in all aspects. Emerging from the closed doors of the central planning era, China has strived to open her economy to the rest of the world and to transform her economic system into a market one so as to achieve economic growth and balanced social development. The strategic thinking behind this drive is the profound belief that China stands to gain from economic and financial globalization. This conviction leads to China having formulated and adhered to a national policy that seeks to increasingly integrate China into the existing world system and to realize economic and social development within the framework of established world order (Dan, 2009 ).
The current financial crisis has shaken the foundation to this faith. The unfolding of the crisis has exposed that the current world order is flawed (Li, X, 2009) . It also reveals the structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the Chinese economy under the direction of opening up ever wider to the rest of the world (Yu, 2008) . The crisis and its fallout have shown that in a world of growing integration and globalization
China cannot be untouched by external shocks and downturns in the world economy.
These facts push the Chinese authorities into a two front battle: to combat the calamitous effect of the ongoing crisis from outside and to prevent internal fragility evolving into a full-fledged crisis from within. The vital battle has just begun (Li, Z. 2009 ).
Much is therefore hinged on how well China is coping with the devastating effect of the current crisis (Prasad, 2009) . If she can successfully muddle through, the world will see a more confident China that opens her arms wider for globalization. However, if fails, the rising tide of nationalism within the nation may drag China into a state in which wheels of reforms are reversed. The world then will have to face a China that is hostile to globalization with mighty forces. The implications of this are huge and the world will be affected in many ways by its adverse consequences (Yep, 2009) .
It is then imperative to research into China's response to the shocking effects of the current global financial crisis and evaluate the performance of China's crisis management. In the rest of the paper, we will first introduce China's perspective on the global financial crisis, which sets the background for understanding China's strategy for crisis management in Section II. Section III will be devoted to China's financial policy and its role in dealing with the crisis. The policy package consists of the financial stimulus and monetary measures that China has taken to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis. In Section IV, we will discuss international dimensions of China's monetary policy which are of particular note and tend to have lasting effects on international policy coordination. Section V presents the concluding remarks on China's crisis responses.
II. Chinese Perspective on the Crisis and Combating

Strategy
China's response to the crisis is largely shaped by her assessment of the nature, depth and possible duration of the crisis. In agreement with international consensus, Chinese economists judge that this crisis is originated in the USA (Baily, et. al, 2008 , Ceccgetti, 2008 , Huang, 2009 ). The root causes of the financial breakdown include inadequate financial regulation, the loosening of traditional precautionary methods in banking, Wall Street greed and extreme financial innovation (Yu, 2008 , Zhang, B., 2008 , Zhen, L. 2009 ). Internationally, this crisis is made possible by flaws in the international financial architecture (Li, X., 2009) . These flaws include disruptive international capital movements and failure of the current international system to regulate excess financial engineering (Dan, 2009 , Shao, 2009 ). In particular, the undisciplined dollar is the source of economic excess. The US dollar as the key international accounting unit, the means of international payments and the most important reserve asset has not been subject to international discipline as under the gold standard. This opens convenient doors for excess consumption within America, and finally leads to global imbalances (Zhen, Z., 2008 , Dan, 2009 ).
There has emerged a pattern of crisis dynamism in the USA and Europe. In that world, the crisis originates in the financial sector and then spreads to the real economy.
Chinese researchers believe that a similar pattern is unlikely to happen in China (Zhang, B., 2008) . Given conditions in China, a full financial meltdown in China can hardly be a likely event in the near term. Thanks to financial reforms in the years prior to the outbreak of the current financial crisis, China has aggressively taken measures to recapitalize major banks, reform their corporate governance systems, and intensify banking regulations. As a result, Chinese banks are not in immediate danger of going under by bad loans and excess financial engineering that has manufactured so many toxicant assets in America and Europe (Li, 2009b , Huang, 2009 ).
The real worry lies in China's real economy. It has an imbalanced structure that turns out to be vulnerable to financial crisis (Prasad, 2007) . Despite her admirable growth record, Chinese economic growth overwhelmingly relies on three pillars, i.e.
investment, export and property development Rajan, 2006, Yu, 2007) . As a result, excess domestic investment has resulted in excess productive capacity which means tight profit margin and possibly many bad loans (He and Cao, 2007) .
Overreliance on export renders Chinese growth susceptible to fluctuations of international markets (He, et. al., 2009) . As in every case, the booming property market turns out to be a black hole that attracts all financial excess and fuels the overheating of investment and excess capacity. Individually, these factors are bad enough to cause financial stress. In their combinations, these factors serve to make China's imbalance only worse and hence more susceptible to the global financial disaster. In this light, the thinking of Chinese advisers points out that rather than a US-type crisis which first starts in the financial sector and then spreads to the real economy, the Chinese one, if any, would most likely to originate in the real sector and then sparks a crisis in the financial sector. Following this thesis, to ward off the disastrous effects of the global financial crisis, the first line of defence for China has to be stabilization of output and employment. So, for China, the chief battle field against the current financial crisis is in the real sector. Putting all these pieces together, the revealed Chinese perspective of the crisis highlights the adversity of the global financial crisis and underlines that the devastating effects warrant utmost attention of the leadership. However, the shocking crisis is unlikely to be as serious as the great depression in the 1930s. Against this backdrop, the Chinese government rolled out its plan for combating the possible hardship brought about by the financial disaster (Mu, 2008) .
The Chinese strategy for fighting the crisis has three distinct dimensions. First, the focal point is to mitigate the immediate effects of the crisis with measures that buttress the real economy and will not undermine the long term health of the economy.
Behind this strategy is the calculation that the current crisis has strong impact effects but moderate duration; therefore it is imperative and cost effective to concentrate on containing its short-run fallout. For one thing, this may buy China breathing room while waiting for the world downturn to bottom up, and with it the end of its adverse impacts on Chinese export as the engine of growth. Furthermore, this may prevent the effect of the global financial crisis spreading. This is obviously more important to China's management of the macro economy, this is obviously more important since, given China's structural vulnerability, it is likely that if not tamed global downturns may trigger a chain reaction in China. As a result, China may suffer from a twin crisis, first in the real sector and then in the financial sector. So, the first key to win the battle against the crisis is to prop up the real sector to prevent the disastrous chain reaction from happening. The most important dimension of China's strategy for crisis management is perhaps the overwhelming emphasis placed on boosting domestic demand. Chinese economists have long realized that the structure of the Chinese economy is biased and domestic demand accounts for too small a proportion in economic growth .
Measures have been taken by the Chinese government to redress this structural imbalance in the recent past but with limited success since localities find it easier to boost growth by undertaking large capital goods investment . The outbreak of the global financial crisis highlights the utmost importance of stimulating domestic demand, which also gives the central government a timely opportunity to persuade local leaders not to overinvest (Hu, 2008) . Consequently, boosting internal demand has become a central ingredient of China's battle plan for alleviating the crisis effects (Woo, 2009a (Woo, , 2009b 
III. Deployment of Financial Policy in the Crisis
Management
In response to the crisis and the resultant global downturn, China has launched a comprehensive relief package (Sharma, 2009 ). This comprehensive plan embraces four broad categories of measures that target at stimulating domestic demand by pump pimping a large amount of government funds (RMB 4 trillion Yuan) together with a tax reduction to accomplish three objectives: to reformulate technological upgrading plans for a large range of industries to enhance competitiveness; to greatly fortify scientific supports for innovations with Chinese-owned intellectual property rights so as to increase future growth potential, and to significantly increase the level of protection provided by the social security system and to expand employment in the city and countryside (Wen, 2009) . Table 1 below. It can be seen that the funding under the fiscal stimulus package is mainly focused on construction and other general projects of social infrastructure. Source: Table 2 Brothers declared bankruptcy, China reduced the interest rate which heralded rate cuts in subsequent months. With these cuts, China's conduct of monetary policy has undergone fundamental changes (Mu, 2008) .
As part of this monetary change, the stance of China's monetary policy has changed from "guard against overheating and inflation" in the earlier years, to "be precautionary with flexibility", and then finally to "ease appropriately" in late was also reduced in a measured way. These actions were designed mainly to enhance supply of liquidity to the circulation.
Then from September, the central bank started to cut back the base rate and to reduce the ratio of required reserves. The base rate was cut in five consecutive rounds, resulting in the one year primary lending rate declining by 2.16%, and the one year savings rate dropping by 1.89%. The required reserve ratio was sequentially cut by four times. The intention of these actions was to give a strong signal to the financial market that the monetary policy now had shifted to promoting economic growth and to seeking financial market stability by guarding off downside risks. Along with ceasing to issue three year central bank bills, the central bank scaled down the intensity of its open market operations to further increase liquidity of the financial markets.
On the credit front, the central bank abolished restriction on commercial banks lending plans. While certain types of loans were kept restricted, loans for earthquake reliefs, agricultural projects and small and medium sized enterprises were encouraged.
Currently, credit provisions for restructuring the economy and technological upgrading are to be guaranteed and promoted. To boost the housing market, the Chinese monetary authorities have also lowered the floor allowed for downward floating of the mortgage rate and provided support for first time buyers to buy a house and for home improvement.
One endeavour by the Chinese central bank is the perfection of the bond market which is critically important for the completeness of China's financial market system.
The improvement program includes increasing the size of inter-bank bond issuance to enhance the funding role of this inter-bank market, development of a variety of debt instruments for non-financial firms such as short-term papers and intermediate notes to widen enterprise funding channels. The program also seeks to improve service infrastructure of the inter-bank market.
These policy actions can be summarized as the Chinese version of monetary stimulus.
The distinct feature of the Chinese enterprise is that it targets exclusively at productive and service projects that are believed to be beneficial for boosting domestic demand, rather than throwing money to thaw the freezing of the inter-bank market or bail out troubled financial institutions.
Whereas China's fiscal stimulus package made headlines around the world, the monetary stimulus largely went unnoticed by international commentators. However, in all honesty, the Chinese monetary stimulus is actually much greater than the fiscal stimulus and is more front-loaded. follows that China's monetary stimulus is not only more powerful than the fiscal stimulus in terms of the funding size, but it could also be quicker to induce its effects on reviving economic activity.
In short, in the face of financial crisis, the focus of China's monetary policy has shifted from keeping guard against inflation to appropriate easing of credit controls.
This shift leads to substantial rate cuts, measured quantitative expansion of credit provision, actions for thawing or preventing inter-bank market freezing and widening of enterprises funding avenues. The new policy regime has a consistent mission, in its own right and by way of supplementing the fiscal stimulus package, to stir up growth through stimulating domestic demand. The target growth is the minimum level that is needed for China to avoid large-scale job losses and social unrest.
IV. International Dimensions of China's Monetary Response
International dimensions of China's monetary policy in relation to dealing with the global crisis are of particular note. In this area, the first issue that has captured international attention is the huge foreign reserves that China has accumulated over the years. The colossal funding pool provides China with sufficient self insurance against potential adversity of external and/or internal shocks. The current global financial crisis timely demonstrates the usefulness of this war chest in China's fighting back against the crisis. Internationally, the cash mountain that China sits on makes her a much sought-after financier of the world, which has dramatically raised China's international profile. Movements of China's reserve policy become a vital parameter of international investment. They now are also a great policy concern to political leaders around the world, particularly at the White House (Morrison, 2008 , Setser, 2009 . To be sure, from time to time Chinese officials would make splashes in international financial markets in relation to possible changes to her reserve management. China has been careful not to indulge in actions that may be disruptive to the working of international financial markets including those of American treasuries and agencies. This is a manifestation of China's reserve management policy which seeks, in this order, the "safety, liquidity and profitability" of reserve holdings. In other words, China's position on international reserves is to use them as self insurance rather than an avenue for international leverage. Within this framework and if safety of her foreign assets can be assured, China can be cooperative with needy countries by providing financial support to them through international financial organizations (Wen, 2009 ).
Related to this is China's vision for reforming the international financial architecture (Pan, 2009) However, given China's conservative position on the value of her foreign reserves, it is unlikely that at the moment and for the foreseeable future China would want to topple the role of the dollar as the world's key currency. What is likely is that China is pursuing a reform agenda that, for diversity and equality, the Chinese currency is being promoted as one of the international reserve currencies.
The third facet of Chinese monetary policy's international engagement involves the RMB exchange rate. China's exchange rate policy has been in the limelight in recent years (Woo, 2008) . Since RMB's un-pegging from the dollar in June 2005, Chinese currency has appreciated by 21%, which is not unsubstantial. During the current crisis, China has watched closely movements of international currencies and the RMB is mainly on the track of appreciation against the dollar. There were occasions in which Chinese currency depreciated from its previous levels, which caused an outcry in Washington. However, China has pledged that she will continue to reform her exchange rate policy following the principle that the reform has to be of own initiatives, controllable, and gradual. It has also been promised that China will move forward steadily along the road of increasing flexibility of the exchange rate system and improving the mechanism of exchange rate formation. The declared mission of China's exchange rate management is to keep the RMB exchange rate stable and at the rational and equilibrium level.
China has been urged to make substantial funding contributions to international rescue operations. One interesting proposal for answering this call is the Panda Bonds as discussed within China (Yu, 2008) . These bonds are to be denominated in Chinese RMB and issued by non-residents of China. The buyers can be anyone who has RMB and is willing to buy at the specified terms of the bond. Foreign issuers may convert the RMB thus raised into US dollars from Chinese exchange authorities and the Chinese government would promise to guarantee the convertibility of RMB from this transaction against the dollar (Yu, 2008) . The chief attraction of the proposed Panda Bonds is that it provides a feasible way of enhancing dollar liquidity internationally without increasing American money supply. As such, this scheme may ease inflationary pressure in the US, since international issuers merely buy existing, rather than newly issued dollars from China with the RMB they raised from the Panda Bonds. China also gains from this proposal because it opens an alternative avenue for diversification of China's huge dollar reserves (Yu, 2008 Available evidence suggests that China in principle is happy to make contributions to international relief operations (Pan, 2009 , Li, 2009b The Chinese promise indicates that, in the face of global financial turmoil, China intends to show that she is a responsible stakeholder of international financial stability.
To this end, China is willing to financially support international relief operations for countries in crisis and the lending conditions can be generous since the loans are extended to prestigious international organizations. However, these Chinese funds are not intended as donations or grants to the IMF. The utmost important consideration for China is the safety of the principal and, for that matter, China would like to evoke protection of the IMF's conditionality. This explains why China is more positive to lending money to the IMF than to other institutions since the IMF's conditionality has proved to be a useful device which to some extent can safeguard the repayments of loans to sovereign borrowers. In the meantime, this move also represents China's further efforts of international diversification of her reserve assets.
Paralleling to her pledge to make substantial contributions to increase the IMF's lending capacity, China powerfully calls for reform to the international financial architecture. Central to this undertaking is enlarging the roles of developing nations in the IMF's decision making process (Hu, 2008 , Wang, 2009 China's attitude towards a formal system of international policy coordination is a mixed one (Woo, 2009c ). China has not been keen for a G-8 membership, fearing it might be counter-productive to unduly associate China with the world's richest nations. The burden that the membership of this club may bestow is simply too high.
There are even fewer indications that China would formally accept the Sino-America G-2 title as this will gain China nothing but forces upon China more responsibilities than she can bear (see Wilder, 2009 , for the discussion on G-2).
The recent G20 summit provides a window for the international community to observe China's vision for a world that needs change. In a press briefing on 23 March 2009, China outlined her "hopes" for the summit. The greatest expectation that China holds is that G20 nations can help boost confidence and improve coordination on economic stimulus policies in a global fight against the financial crisis. The Chinese spokesman appeals to G20 members to shore up the fight against protectionism and uphold their financial commitments to the world's poorer countries. Efforts should be made to achieve substantial progress in the reform of international financial institutions. The Chinese representative stresses that the reform should increase the representation and say of developing countries. By pressing world leaders for an overhaul of the global financial system according to her own agenda, China makes a statement that the rising China wants an international financial governance system that allows China to play an enlarging role.
However, rather than act as an economic superpower in waiting, the Chinese reaction to international calls for policy coordination has largely been unassuming. Other than giving measured support for international policy lending through the IMF, China has been careful not to commit herself too much. This is probably the case because China knows her limits, but fundamentally, the Chinese calculate that the nation as it is now has little to gain from international policy coordination (Corsetti, 2005) .
In contrast, China has chosen to focus on regional cooperation proactively (Li, 2009c) .
As Malaysian ringgit (about 1.08 billion USD). Of note is the fact that in these agreements, the Chinese currency, rather than the dollar as in other similar swap agreements, is the vehicle and key currency.
It is not accurate to state that China has become a dominate power in Asian financial cooperation. However, she certainly is a major driving force of the process. The current global financial crisis has given renewed impetus to closer Asian financial cooperation and the Chinese role in this process can be reasonably expected to grow.
With the rise of the Chinese currency RMB as an international currency for regional monetary cooperation architecture, the Chinese popular mediums are now even talking about the possibility of an optimal currency in Asia centred on, among other things, the RMB.
V. Concluding Remarks
The global financial crisis is hitting China hard. Exporting is shrinking, growth is slowing and jobs are suffering. As a result, social tensions are rising and questions have been raised as to whether globalization is beneficial to China and whether China's market oriented reform is putting the nation on the right track. The financial crisis therefore represents a great challenge for China to embrace globalisation. If overwhelmed by the current crisis, China would become a nationalist forte with mighty forces against globalization. Given the possible repercussions of this scenario, the world will be greatly affected by China's handling of the crisis.
China has been quick in responding to the crisis. In June 2008 when China was in the final and most crucial stage for putting up the Olympic Games show, the Chinese authorities started to formulate the plan for dealing with the crisis and its possible fallout. This shows that China realizes that the forthcoming financial turmoil is going to serious with devastating consequences. The duration of the crisis is estimated to be moderate in that it will last for about two years. So, to the Chinese leadership, the crisis is going to be a serious disaster but not as bad as the great depression of the 1930s. For the specifics of the possible crisis attack, China judges that an America-type crisis is unlikely to happen in the country. Rather, the main threat would be that the Chinese real sector is being dragged down under by the adversity of the crisis, which in turn sparks a crisis in the financial sector. China's strategy for combating the crisis therefore is to deal with the immediate crisis effects in the real economy in the first place and to look for opportunities in the meantime. The overwhelming emphasis is placed on expanding domestic demand to fuel growth.
Following this strategy to crisis management, China has rolled out a comprehensive package of combating measures. Central to the package is the role played by the financial policy, which has two planks i.e. the policy measures in the fiscal and monetary sectors. The fiscal expansion package hit the headlines around the globe with the intensity of government financial support for infrastructure and public service projects. The monetary stimulus comes to prominence in a slow process in which the stance of the Chinese monetary policy changed from being precautionary against inflation with flexibility to appropriate easing to promote growth. After several rounds of rate cuts, the Chinese version of quantitative easing has taken the central stage. The monetary stimulus proves more powerful than the fiscal counterpart and more front loaded. In China's battle with the financial crisis and the world downturn it has caused, the monetary stimulus is playing a leading role at the moment.
The international dimensions of China's monetary policy typify how China turns a crisis into a world of opportunity. China has taken a conservative approach to the management of her huge reserves. In this approach, China puts the safety of these reserves first, followed by considerations of liquidity and profitability and has been careful not to disrupt American financial markets. The position of China has consistently been that these international reserves are accumulated as self insurance rather than an avenue for international leverage. Within this framework and if safety of these foreign assets can be assured, China can be cooperative in providing finance to countries in crisis through international financial organizations.
China is also relatively conservative in giving funding promises to international relief operation. In addition to the Panda Bonds, China makes it clear that the chief acceptable way of her making funding contributions to give financial support to countries in crisis is through international financial organizations. For this matter, China supports the motion to increase the IMF's lending capacity and possibly to buy the bonds it issues should the IMF need to do so.
China is actively calling for reform of international financial architecture. Chinese advisors have argued that the increase in China's funding contributions has to be paralleled by an increase in China's profile in the power structure in the IMF. In many occasions, China has acted as spokesman of the emerging and developing economies by making cases for increasing their say in world financial affairs. But on the whole, China has been cautious not to commit herself too much as she knows her limits, and she knows that she has little to gain from international policy coordination.
As such, China has chosen to focus on regional cooperation proactively and considerable progress has been made in this area. China now plays a pivotal role in
Asian financial markets and is the centre of gravity of Asian financial cooperation. To what extent China has been successful in handling the adversity of the crisis is still to be seen. There is certainly a lot to be done for China to improve the economic structure, boost domestic demand, calm down the property market and, above all, to create millions of jobs (Woo, 2009a) . These are no easy tasks, and the Chinese would probably never be able to declare a total victory on any of these matters. However, early signs have emerged that the worst perhaps has turned over and China is now on the way to see the recovery of the economy.
Time Events
June 2008 
November
The Chinese government launched large package to stimulate growth and employment.
The package would spend 4 trillion Yuan (estimated US$586 billion) by 2010 on infrastructure and social welfare projects, including constructing housing, rural infrastructure, railways, highways, airports, and rebuilding communities devastated by the earthquake in southwest China in May. At the same time, the government promised to reform the VAT system and the central bank was to promote bank lending to support growth, with priority being given to key projects of national importance. Also, the government formally changed the fiscal stance from "prudent" to "proactive" and the monetary policy stance from"moderately tight" to "moderately easy."
The government decided to roll out the reform of the VAT covering the whole nation.
Under this reform, capital spending could be deducted from the VAT. This is in line with international practice and reduces the corporate tax burden by about RMB 120 billion (0.4 percent of GDP). percentage points to reach 3.51%. For such loans whose maturity is 5 years or longer, the rate was cut back by 0.54 percentage points to 4.05%. In the meantime, the central bank's lending rates to financial institutions were reduced. Of these rates, the deposit rate for required reserves dropped from 1.89% to 1.62%, downed by 0.27 percentage points.
The deposit rate for excess reserves declined from 0.99% to 0.72%, a reduction of 0.27 percentage point. The re-lending rate for one-year liquidity reduced from 4.68% to 3.60%, other re-lending rates were adjusted downward accordingly. The re-discount rate was downed from 4.32% to 2.97%.
December
The State council held its executive meeting to discuss and formulate 9 measures aimed at promoting economic growth through financial channels.
10 December The State Council made arrangements for farming work and decided to increase subsidies for agricultural machines and equipment purchased by farmers.
17 December The government rolled out a reform program for reforming the prices of oil products, and related taxes and fees. Arrangements were also made to map out measures to promote healthy development of the property markets.
December The General Office of the State Council issued Opinions on Promoting Healthy
Development of the Property Market. The Opinions have 6 sections and 13 clauses. It stressed that greater efforts must be made to intensify construction of housing for social security. The government made further clarification to its position that consumption of common commercial housing is to be encouraged. Property firms should be responsive to market changes and should take initiatives to promote sales of commercial housing at reasonable prices. The responsibility of local governments in stabilizing the property market is to be stressed. Monitoring of the property market should be intensified.
December
The Chinese central bank decided to lower the required ratio of reserves by 0.5%, effective 25 December 2008.
The Chinese central bank decided to change the base rates of deposits, lending and the central bank's re-lending and re-discount rates to financial institutions. The one year deposit rate was cut by 0.27 percentage points, downed from 2.52% to 2.25%. The one year lending rate dropped from 5.58% to 5.315.58%, also downed by 0.27 percentage points. Other tiers of lending and savings interest rates were subject to changes accordingly. The lending rate of less than five-year personal mortgage loans provided by Public Housing Fund was cut by 0.18 percentage points to 3.33%. For 5 years or longer of such loans, the rate was cut back by 0.18 percentage points to 3.87%. In the meantime, the central bank's lending rates to financial institutions were reduced. Of these rates, the re-lending rate for one-year liquidity reduced from 3.60% to 3.33%, a reduction of 0.27 percentage points. The one-year re-lending rate to rural credit society (excluding emergent loans) was reduced from 3.42% to 2.88%, a decline of 0.54 percentage point.
Other ties of re-lending rates were adjusted downward accordingly. The re-discount rate was downed from 2.97% to 1.80%, a cut of 1.17 percentage point.
The executive meeting of State Council analyzed and then made arrangements for adopting measures to revitalize goods distribution, expand consumption and maintain stable growth of foreign trade. Also considered are the measures for ensuring production and supply of fertilizers and to promote reform and development of the fertilizer industry. The executive meeting also examined and passed in principle the special major science and technology program for computer numerically controlled machine tools and basic manufacturing equipment.
The Chinese government proclaimed the Views about Reviving Distribution and Expanding Consumption, according to which the campaign of sending household electronic goods to the countryside would be extended from more than 10 provinces to the whole county. In the meantime, motor bicycles, computers, hot water machines (including all types powered by solar energy, gas and electricity), and air conditioners were now included in the list to qualify for receiving policy subsidies.
1 January 2009 China abolished quantity controls and licensing management for textile exports to USA and licensing management of textile exports to Europe. Enterprises are no longer subject to examination of operational quality and qualifications.
7 January In the face of a grimy job market, the State Council discussed and formulated seven measures for intensifying works in relation to graduates' employment. 
